From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:173-179 (2000)
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Abstract

In Virtues of the Mind I object to process reliabilism on the grounds that it does not explain the good of knowledge in addition to the good of true belief. In this paper I wish to develop this objection in more detail, and will then argue that this problem pushes us first in the direction of two offspring of process reliabilism—faculty reliabilism and proper functionalism, and, finally, to a true virtue epistemology.

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Linda Zagzebski
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.

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