A Counterexample to Modus Tollens

Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper defends a counterexample to Modus Tollens, and uses it to draw some conclusions about the logic and semantics of indicative conditionals and probability operators in natural language. Along the way we investigate some of the interactions of these expressions with 'knows', and we call into question the thesis that all knowledge ascriptions have truth-conditions.

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Seth Yalcin
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Belief about Probability.Ray Buchanan & Sinan Dogramaci - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
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Two Ways to Want?Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (2):65-98.
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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
A philosophical guide to conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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