The Analysis of Data and the Evidential Scope of Neuroimaging Results

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1179-1203 (2018)
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Abstract

The sceptical positions philosophers have adopted with respect to neuroimaging data are based on detailed evaluations of subtraction, which is one of many data analysis techniques used with neuroimaging data. These positions are undermined when the epistemic implications of the use of a diversity of data analysis techniques are taken into account. I argue that different data analysis techniques reveal different patterns in the data. Through the use of multiple data analysis techniques, researchers can produce results that are locally robust. Thus, the epistemology of neuroimaging must take into consideration the details of the different data analysis techniques that are used to evaluate neuroimaging data, and the specific theoretical aims those techniques are deployed towards. _1_ Introduction _2_ Scepticism about Neuroimaging _3_ Data Analysis and Evidence _4_ Deconvolution and Pattern Classification Analysis _4.1_ Deconvolution analysis _4.2_ Region of interest selection _4.3_ Pattern classification analysis _5_ The Strength of Multiple Analyses _6_ Conclusion

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Jessey Wright
University of Western Ontario

References found in this work

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