6 found
Joseph B. McCaffrey [3]Joseph McCaffrey [3]
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Joseph McCaffrey
University of Pittsburgh
  1.  16
    The Brain’s Heterogeneous Functional Landscape.Joseph B. McCaffrey - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):1010-1022.
    Multifunctionality poses significant challenges for human brain mapping. Cathy Price and Karl Friston argue that brain regions perform many functions in one sense and a single function in another. Thus, neuroscientists must revise their “cognitive ontologies” to obtain systematic mappings. Colin Klein draws a different lesson from these findings: neuroscientists should abandon systematic mappings for context-sensitive ones. I claim that neither account succeeds as a general treatment of multifunctionality. I argue that brain areas, like genes or organs, are multifunctional in (...)
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  2.  31
    Mixtures and Psychological Inference with Resting State fMRI.Joseph McCaffrey & David Danks - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):583-611.
    In this essay, we examine the use of resting state fMRI data for psychological inferences. We argue that resting state studies hold the paired promises of discovering novel functional brain networks, and of avoiding some of the limitations of task-based fMRI. However, we argue that the very features of experimental design that enable resting state fMRI to support exploratory science also generate a novel confound. We argue that seemingly key features of resting state functional connectivity networks may be artefacts resulting (...)
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  3.  28
    Reconceiving Conceptual Vehicles: Lessons From Semantic Dementia.Joseph McCaffrey - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):337-354.
    What are the vehicles of conceptual thought? Recently, cognitive scientists and philosophers of psychology have developed quite different theories about what kinds of representations concepts are. At one extreme, amodal theories claim that concepts are representations whose vehicles are distinct from those used in perceptual processes. At the other end of the spectrum, neo-empiricism proposes that concepts are perceptual representations grounded in the mind's sensory, motor, and affective systems. In this essay, I examine how evidence from the neuropsychological disorder semantic (...)
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  4.  12
    The Reification Objection to Bottom-Up Cognitive Ontology Revision.Joseph B. McCaffrey & Edouard Machery - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39.
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  5. Philosophical Issues About Concepts.Joseph McCaffrey & Edouard Machery - 2012 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 3:265-279.
  6.  20
    Concepts in the Brain: Neuroscience, Embodiment, and Categorization.Joseph B. McCaffrey - 2013 - ProtoSociology 30:167-190.
    What does cognitive neuroscience contribute to our philosophical understanding of concepts? Over the past several decades, brain researchers have employed the tools of cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology to probe the structure and func­tion of the conceptual system. The results of this effort, which are often extremely surprising, raise more questions than they resolve. Brain research has invigorated age-old philosophical debates about the nature of concepts—such as whether concepts are perceptual representations—and generated new controversies about how conceptual knowledge is organized. In (...)
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