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Fred Dretske [125]Fred I. Dretske [52]F. Dretske [6]F. I. Dretske [2]
Frederick Irwin Dretske [1]Freg I. Dretske [1]
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Fred Dretske
Last affiliation: Duke University
  1. Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning by viewing meaning as (...)
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  2. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  3. Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  4.  34
    Knowledge and the Flow of Information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.
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  5. Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  6. Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
  7. Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
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  8. Laws of Nature.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
    It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are (...)
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  9. Misrepresentation.Fred I. Dretske - 1986 - In Radu Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
  10. Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
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  11. Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
  12. Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.
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  13. Conscious Experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  14. Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1970 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
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  15. The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge.Fred Dretske - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
  16. Seeing and Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):121-124.
     
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  17. ``The Case Against Closure".Fred I. Dretske - 2005 - In M. Steup & Earnest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. pp. 13--25.
     
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  18. Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays.Fred Dretske - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  19. Experience as Representation.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
  20. Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90.
    A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the (...)
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  21. Explaining Behaviour.F. Dretske - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):157-165.
     
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  22. Contrastive Statements.Fred I. Dretske - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.
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  23. Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  24. The Mind's Awareness of Itself.Fred Dretske - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1):103-124.
  25. Perception Without Awareness.Fred Dretske - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 147--180.
  26. Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure.Fred Dretske - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 13-26.
     
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  27. Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
    The debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology can be viewed as a disagreement about whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Taking an epistemic right to believe P as an authorization to not only accept P as true but to use P as a positive reason for accepting other propositions, the debate is about whether there are unjustified justifiers. It is about whether there are propositions that provide for others what nothing need provide for them—viz., reasons (...)
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  28. Reasons and causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  29.  18
    Epistemology and Cognition.Fred Dretske - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (5):265-270.
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  30. How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie.Fred Dretske - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. pp. 1--14.
  31. Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia?Fred Dretske - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  32. What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness.Fred Dretske - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
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    Naturalizing the Mind.David Sosa & Fred Dretske - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):429.
    Aware that the representational thesis is more plausible for the attitudinal than for the phenomenal, Dretske courageously focuses on sensory experience, where progress in our philosophical understanding of the mental has lagged. His view, essentially, is that what makes any mental state what it is is not so much what it's like as what it's about.
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  34. The Intentionality of Cognitive States.Fred I. Dretske - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.
  35. Perception and Other Minds.Fred I. Dretske - 1973 - Noûs 7 (1):34-44.
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
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  36. If You Can’T Make One, You Don’T Know How It Works.Fred I. Dretske - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):468-482.
  37.  28
    Reply to Hawthorne.Fred Dretske - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 43--46.
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  38. Introspection.Fred Dretske - 19934 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.
  39. Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior.Fred Dretske - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    1. Causal explanations depend on our interests, our purposes, and our prior knowledge. ⇒ No uniquely real causal explanation.
     
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  40. Referring to Events.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.
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  41. Externalism and Modest Contextualism.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173-186.
    Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes (...)
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  42. Can Events Move?F. Dretske - 1967 - Mind 76 (304):479-492.
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  43. The Epistemology of Belief.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
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  44. Machines and the Mental.Fred Dretske - 1985 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59 (1):23-33.
  45. Information and Closure.Fred Dretske - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):409-413.
    Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an (...)
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  46.  77
    Simple Seeing.Fred I. Dretske - 1979 - In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--15.
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  47. Change Blindness.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
  48. Are Experiences Conscious?Fred Dretske - 1995 - In Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
  49. Precis of 'Knowledge and the Flow of Information'.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  50. Minimal Rationality.Fred I. Dretske - 2006 - In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
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