Abstract

Metaphysical claims have often come under criticism for being nonsensical. But it is by no means clear what such criticism amounts to, for the charge that metaphysical claims are "nonsense" comes to different things for different critics. The preliminary aim of my dissertation is to understand the various conceptions of nonsense that are in play in the work of Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Frege, and Stroud. My ultimate aim is to evaluate the extent to which these conceptions of nonsense can serve as fruitful tools of philosophical criticism. ;I begin my dissertation by uncovering a distinction between two conceptions of nonsense, one advanced by Carnap and the other by Wittgenstein. I show that prominent commentators on Wittgenstein have misunderstood his remarks about nonsense: they have attributed a Carnapian conception of nonsense to him, when in fact Wittgenstein is concerned to expose that conception as incoherent. ;A problem in appreciating Wittgenstein's alternative conception of nonsense is that it seems too weak to underwrite his criticisms of traditional philosophy. I show that Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense is quite strong enough for his purposes by employing it in a criticism of a traditional philosophical argument--specifically, Barry Stroud's case for philosophical skepticism--that initially appears invulnerable to it. ;The last part of my dissertation draws on my understanding of Carnap's and Wittgenstein's conceptions of nonsense for a re-appraisal of Heidegger's notorious discussion of "the Nothing"--the discussion that Carnap singles out as an especially flagrant instance of philosophical nonsense. I argue that, while Heidegger does lapse into nonsense, he does so intentionally; he sees his nonsensical utterances as wrung from him by the character of his metaphysical enquiry into the nature of thought. I find a striking parallel to this in Frege's attempt to elucidate the nature of concepts and objects. It turns out that Heidegger, Frege, and even Carnap are all committed to the idea that some nonsensical sentences convey a kind of sense. By using Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense to outline a radical criticism of this commitment, I indicate a way of overcoming both Heidegger's metaphysics and Carnap's anti-metaphysics