Abstract

Cora Diamond is among the most influential Wittgenstein commentators of recent years. One of her memorable contributions to the literature is her colorful characterization of some of the Tractatus interpretations she disagrees with – she calls them “chickening out” interpretations. “Chickening out” interpretations are ones which acknowledge Wittgenstein’s claim at 6.54 that his propositions are nonsense, but still hold that there is a deep sense in which Wittgenstein’s nonsense shows us something about reality, even if it does not say anything. On Diamond’s view, the idea that there is something shown about reality which cannot be expressed is itself part of what we are meant to discard when we recognize the Tractarian propositions as nonsense. Discarding this idea of showing is part of what it means to “throw away the ladder after [we have] climbed up it” (6.54). But 6.54, the passage in the Tractatus which serves as a focus for Diamond’s austere reading of nonsense, also points out what may be a problem for Diamond.Wittgenstein begins that passage by remarking that his “propositions serve as elucidations”. Can Diamond’s account of nonsense make room for the idea that Tractarian nonsense is elucidatory? I will consider two aspects of Diamond’s reading, and show how they are in tension. To begin, I will discuss her general account of nonsense in more detail. Then, I will look at her account of nonsense as elucidatory, focusing on the concrete examples she uses to explain what it means for nonsense to elucidate. I will argue that her general account of nonsense makes her account of how nonsense elucidates problematic.