Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (3):384-393 (2008)

Authors
Eric Wiland
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Abstract
Derek Parfit has notably argued that while a moral theory should not be directly self-defeating, there is nothing necessarily wrong with a moral theory that is only indirectly self-defeating. Here I resist this line of argument. I argue instead that indirectly self-defeating moral theories are indeed problematic. Parfit tries to sidestep the oddities of indirectly self-defeating theories by focusing on the choice of dispositions rather than actions. But the very considerations that can make it impossible to achieve a theory's aims if we try to do what the theory recommends can also make it impossible to achieve a theory's aims if we instead try to adopt the dispositions the theory recommends. What makes a theory indirectly self-defeating has little to do with the object of choice, but with the nature of choosing itself
Keywords DISPOSITION   INDIRECT   UTILITARIANISM   PARFIT   SELF-DEFEATING
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DOI 10.1163/174552408X369727
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Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.Peter Railton - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.
The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
Option Ranges.Timothy Chappell - 2001 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (2):107–118.

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