Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating

In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (1984)
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Abstract

Examines whether it is an objection to S that, in some cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating; some bad defences of S and M ‐ why it is an objection to M that this theory is directly collectively self‐defeating; how and why we ought to solve this problem by revising M. The different parts of moral theories are also explored.

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Derek Parfit
Last affiliation: Oxford University

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