Knowledge within the Margin for Error

Mind 116 (463):723 - 726 (2007)
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Abstract

Roy Sorensen's criticism of my use of margin for error principles to explain ignorance in borderline cases fails because it misidentifies the relevant margin for error principles. His alternative explanation in terms of truth-maker gaps is briefly criticized

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Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.
On the epistemic status of borderline cases.Zoltán Vecsey - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):179-184.

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
Vagueness and contradiction.Roy A. Sorensen - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy Sorensen - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):695-703.
Vagueness.Loretta Torrago - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):637.

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