Authors
Mario Gomez-Torrente
National Autonomous University of Mexico
Abstract
Timothy Williamson’s potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation seems to underlie his justification for both kinds of principles. Besides, the margin for error principles of the first kind can be used in the derivation of unacceptable consequences, while the margin for error principles of the second kind can be shown to be compatible with the falsity of epistemicism, under a number of assumptions acceptable to the epistemicist
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00145.x
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Inexact Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):217-242.

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Citations of this work BETA

Higher-Order Sorites Paradox.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
The Impossibility of Vagueness.Kit Fine - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
Epistemicism About Vagueness and Meta-Linguistic Safety.Stephen Kearns & Ofra Magidor - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):277-304.
Temporal Externalism and Epistemic Theories of Vagueness.Henry Jackman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):79-94.
Epistemicist Models: Comments on Gómez-Torrente and Graff.Timothy Williamson - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):143-150.

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Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error. [REVIEW]R. M. Sainsbury - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.

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