Knowing How

Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444 (2001)
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Abstract

Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.

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Author Profiles

Jason Stanley
Yale University
Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Skill.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):713-726.

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