Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations

Synthese 194 (2) (2017)
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Abstract

I argue that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which agents have the knowledge-how to \ in virtue of standing in an appropriate relation to a proposition, is only half right. On the composition view defended here, knowledge-how at least typically requires both propositional knowledge and motor representations. Motor representations are not mere dispositions to behavior because they have representational content, and they play a central role in realizing the intelligence in knowledge-how. But since motor representations are not propositional, propositional knowledge is not sufficient for knowledge-how

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Neil Levy
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.
Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):286-305.

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References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.

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