Could experience disconfirm the propositions of arithmetic?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):55--84 (2000)
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Abstract

Alberto Casullo ("Necessity, Certainty, and the A Priori", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, 1988) argues that arithmetical propositions could be disconfirmed by appeal to an invented scenario, wherein our standard counting procedures indicate that 2 + 2 != 4. Our best response to such a scenario would be, Casullo suggests, to accept the results of the counting procedures, and give up standard arithmetic. While Casullo's scenario avoids arguments against previous "disconfirming" scenarios, it founders on the assumption, common to scenario and response, that arithmetic might be independent of standard counting procedures. Here I show, by attention to tallying as the simplest form of counting, that this assumption is incoherent: given standard counting procedures, then (on pain of irrationality) arithmetical theory follows.

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Jessica M. Wilson
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

In defense of Countabilism.David Builes & Jessica M. Wilson - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2199-2236.
Non-ontological Structuralism†.Michael Resnik - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):303-315.

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References found in this work

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Philosophy of Mathematics.Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):488-489.
Modest a priori knowledge.Donna M. Summerfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):39-66.

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