Backsliding and Bad Faith: Aspiration, Disavowal, and (Residual) Practical Identities

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (1) (2023)
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Abstract

Disavowals such as "That's not who I am" are one way to distance ourselves from unsavory actions in order to try to mitigate our responsibility for them. Although such disclaimers can be what Harry Frankfurt calls "shabbily insincere devices for obtaining unmerited indulgence," they can also be a way to renew our commitments to new values as part of the processes of aspiration and moral improvement. What, then, separates backsliding aspirants from those in denial who seek unmerited indulgence? Drawing on Christine Korsgaard, on the one hand, and Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, on the other, I propose a two-dimensional account of practical identity that makes sense of a certain kind of self-ignorance and helps us distinguish the aspirant from the superficially similar cases of denial and resignation. A key factor is how one responds to what I call residual practical identities.

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Justin F. White
Brigham Young University

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References found in this work

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Am I a Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism.Neil Levy - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):534-551.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - In Free Will. Oxford University Press.
The Faintest Passion.Harry Frankfurt - 1992 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):5-16.
Identification and externality.Harry Frankfurt - 1977 - In Amelie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.

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