Abstract

The problem appeared to be a twofold one. First, in regard to the thinking of St. Thomas in general, I found it was mostly discussed by specialists or mediaevalists among themselves: a sort of "preaching to the converts" which tended to multiply Thomistic scholarship, especially with an eye to Aquinas' sources and contemporaries, but leave the great majority of today's philosophy students and scholars uninformed and untouched. Secondly, one of the great fundamental questions of philosophy, that of the relation between truth and real existence, no longer seemed relevant to the contemporary discussions of truth. Now, I became convinced that Aquinas has much to say that is worthwhile, vigorous and exciting about such problems, so that he ought to play a major role in the study of epistemological questions, among others. This conviction prompted me to attempt to combine my desire to demonstrate the present day relevance of Aquinas' vital thought, with the defense of the most complete, solid and satisfying epistemological approach I had come across. Through a detailed examination of the texts of St. Thomas, especially those of the De veritate, proceeding step by step, I traced his thinking about truth and its relation to existence. In each chapter I devoted the final portion to a tracing of possible connections, and the seeking for possible overtones and "resonances" existing between the thinking of Aquinas and that of another deeply existential thinker, Martin Heidegger, without, however, attempting an anachronistic and too facile identification of the two philosophers on any specific point. I simply attempt to discover "what is said in the saying," and thus to trace their somewhat parallel paths up to a point, and then acknowledge their equally illuminating divergences. By following this methodology, I believe I have shown St. Thomas' relevance, through the "comparisons" I traced with a contemporary thinker of Heidegger's calibre, while at the same time I outlined an actually complete doctrine of truth, which is neither limited in its scope, nor less than satisfying in its conclusions