Naturalism’s Perils, Naturalism’s Promises: A Comment on Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics

Neuroethics 3 (3):215-222 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his Experiments in Ethics, Appiah focuses mostly on the dimension of naturalism as a naturalism of deprivation - naturalism’s apparent robbing us of aspects of the world that we had held dear. The aim of this paper is to remind him of that naturalism has a dimension of plenitude as well - its capacity to enrich our conception of the world as well. With regard to character, we argue that scientific psychology can help provide a conception of character as dynamic, in a way that may preserve many key aspects of eudaimonistic ethics from the situationists’ challenge. With regard to intuition, we address Appiah’s worry that naturalistic explanations of the sources of our intuitions may leave us feeling that those intuitions have been thereby debunked. We suggest that it may be that feeling of debunking that should itself be debunked

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,709

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Three sorts of naturalism.Hans Fink - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):202–221.
Philosophical Naturalism at the Turn of the Century.Robert Audi - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:27-45.
Introduction - the nature of naturalism.David Macarthur & Mario De Caro - 2004 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in question. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 1-20.
Experiments in ethics.Anthony Appiah - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-05-07

Downloads
64 (#252,064)

6 months
6 (#510,793)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A Theory of the a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:29-55.
The incoherence of empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.

Add more references