Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):145-160 (2008)

Authors
Michael Pelczar
National University of Singapore
Abstract
After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism—numerical dualism and modal dualism —we argue that Descartes is a numericaldualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes’ views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
Keywords Descartes  dualism  materialism
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Reprint years 2016
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI southernjphil20084617
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