Semantics for Reasons

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Kevin Scharp (2019)
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Abstract

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be-rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

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Author Profiles

Bryan R. Weaver
Ohio State University
Kevin Scharp
University of Twente

Citations of this work

The Ethics of Conceptualization: A Needs-Based Approach.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A defense of QUD reasons contextualism.Bryan R. Weaver & Kevin Scharp - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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