Abstract

A spate of social scientific literature gives the impression that societies in the twenty-first century are overrun with ‘neoliberal subjects’. But what does it actually mean to be a neoliberal subject? And in what ways does this concept relate to ‘neoliberalism’, more generally? In this article, I distinguish between four common ways of thinking about ‘neoliberalism’: as a set of economic policies, as a hegemonic ideological project, as a political rationality and form of governmentality and as a specific type of embodied subjectivity. I argue that while neoliberalisms, and potentially hold clear conceptual connections to one another – notwithstanding the quite real tensions between them – their relationship to neoliberalism is often tenuous at best. That is, the evidence routinely offered to demonstrate the existence of neoliberalism bears almost no necessary relationship to neoliberalisms, or. I conclude that, for both academic and political reasons, scholars should be more careful when invoking the monolithic notion of a ‘neoliberal subject’.