Projecting Chances: A Humean Vindication and Justification of the Principal Principle

Philosophy of Science 72 (1):241-261 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Faced with the paradox of undermining futures, Humeans have resigned themselves to accounts of chance that severely conflict with our intuitions. However, such resignation is premature: The problem is Humean supervenience (HS), not Humeanism. This paper develops a projectivist Humeanism on which chance claims are understood as normative, rather than fact stating. Rationality constraints on the cotenability of norms and factual claims ground a factual-normative worlds semantics that, in addition to solving the Frege-Geach problem, delivers the intuitive set of possibilia for each chance law. Hence, the account does not entail HS, and the paradox does not arise. A confirmation theory is developed, and the 'principal principle' is justified.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 84,108

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Principled chances.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):27-41.
Chance, credence, and the principal principle.Robert Black - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.
On what we know about chance.Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.


Added to PP

104 (#136,736)

6 months
2 (#334,016)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Barry Ward
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

References found in this work

Essays on Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):96-99.
Introduction” to his.D. Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 2.
Pragmatics and Empiricism.Brian Skyrms - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):514-516.
Opinions and chances.Simon Blackburn - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 175--96.

Add more references