Abstract

The aim of the article is to give an analysis of what Thomas Aquinas means by the natural desire to see the divine essence. 1. His notion of 'being' is dynamic. All beings are substances of a definite nature. To be is to exist towards something in which the nature of the substance attains its proper ultimate perfection (esse completum in bonitate). The thus being related of the substance to its proper perfection is the appetitus naturalis. 2. 'Natural desire' is a technical term. It means a basic striving, which suppose the ontological relation but is formally an act of the will, manifesting man's natural appetite in the dynamic movement of his selfconscious life. 3. The first question concerning the natural desire is the nature of the act. The paradox of the natural desire is that it ultimately aims at a perfection which man cannot attain by his natural powers but only trough a free gracious self-gift of God. Thomas generally says that the desire of the Blessed Vision is natural, but sometimes he seems to imply that such a desire is beyond the power of the rational nature. We have to distinguish, then, between the natural desire which is a simplex velie and the supernatural desire which is an intentio. Simplex velie as the first movement of the will towards the end precedes the bifurcation towards either intention (will of the end as actually obtainable by available means) or wish (velleitas : conditional will following upon the discovery that the desired good is impossible or too difficult to attain). As the object of the natural desire is necessarily willed, this desire can never degenerate into a simple wish. 4. The second question is about the object of the natural desire. A distinction must be made between the formal and the material determination of the object. Formally considered, the object is signified in different ways : as ratio boni, final end and beatitude. It also implies the conditions necessary for obtaining to the final end of a truly human existence, whatever this end may concretely be considered to consist in. Such conditions are : to exist, to live, to lead a moral and intellectual existence in society. Consequently, the cognitio veri belongs to the formal determination of the object of the natural desire and even primarily. Starting from this formal determination Thomas proceeds to the consideration of the material determination, and he shows how the natural desire strives beyond all possible finite ends towards the knowledge of the infinite. The proper object of the intellect is the quod quid est of the things. When man comes to know from the finite things the infinite cause, without knowing the essence of this cause, his natural desire is excited and can only come to rest in the knowledge of the essence of God. This is possible only through an immediate union of the intellect with God Himself