Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character

Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262 (4):561-576 (2012)
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Abstract

In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise out of a reflexive stance on a certain make-believe process. For MC, success of a fictional character across different works amounts to the fact that, first, different work-bound ficta are related with each other by means of a relation weaker than numerical identity, transfictional sameness, and second, that all those ficta are related by transfictional inclusion to a fictum that in some sense gather them all, the so-called general character. Since a general character is an abstract constructed entity, moreover, the more those particular ficta are generated, the more general fictional characters including all of them arise.

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Alberto Voltolini
University of Turin

References found in this work

Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nonexistent Objects.Terence Parsons - 1980 - Yale University Press.
The things we mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans & John Mcdowell - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):534-538.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.

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