Measurement of Statistical Evidence: Picking Up Where Hacking and Others Left Off

Philosophy of Science 84 (5):853-865 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Hacking’s Law of Likelihood says—paraphrasing—that data support hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 whenever the likelihood ratio for H1 over H2 exceeds 1. But Hacking later noted a seemingly fatal flaw in the LR itself: it cannot be interpreted as the degree of “evidential significance” across applications. I agree with Hacking about the problem, but I do not believe the condition is incurable. I argue here that the LR can be properly calibrated with respect to the underlying evidence, and I sketch the rudiments of a methodology for so doing.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,127

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-12-15

Downloads
27 (#609,703)

6 months
7 (#491,177)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Veronica J. Vieland
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Probability and the Weighing of Evidence.I. J. Good - 1950 - Philosophy 26 (97):163-164.
Likelihood. [REVIEW]Ian Hacking - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):132-137.
Review: Likelihood. [REVIEW]Ian Hacking - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):132 - 137.

Add more references