Probability and the Weighing of Evidence

Philosophy 26 (97):163-164 (1950)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Probability and the Weighing of Evidence.Irving John Good - 1950 - Charles Griffin & Company Limited: London.
Legal reasoning with subjective logic.Audun Jøsang & Viggo A. Bondi - 2000 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 8 (4):289-315.
Conditionalizing on knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):89-121.
Stronger evidence.Peter Achinstein - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (3):329-350.
Old evidence and new explanation.Carl G. Wagner - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):677-691.
Weighing Complex Evidence in a Democratic Society.Heather Douglas - 2012 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):139-162.
Bayes's Theorem.Richard Swinburne (ed.) - 2002 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press UK.
Nearly bayesian uncertain reasoning methods.Paul Snow - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):779-780.
David Hume and the probability of miracles.George I. Mavrodes - 1998 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (3):167-182.
Discussion note: Positive relevance defended.Sherrilyn Roush† - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (1):110-116.
Statistische Schlussweisen in Entscheidungsbegründungen.Michael Mauer - 2015 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 101 (1):87-123.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-21

Downloads
3 (#1,686,544)

6 months
1 (#1,510,037)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

On the principle of total evidence.Irving John Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.
Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.
Precis of knowledge and the flow of information.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90.
Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.

View all 113 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references