Authors
Alfredo Vernazzani
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Abstract
Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.
Keywords Facts  Philosophy of Psychology  Contents of Perception  Contents of Consciousness  Sensory Individuals  Metaphysics  Metaphysics of Objects  Bundles  Object perception
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12336
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

How Artworks Modify Our Perception of the World.Alfredo Vernazzani - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.

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