Perception as Openness to Facts

Abstract

The image of perception as openness to fact is best understood as the claim that the contents of perception are mind-independent facts. However, I argue against John McDowell that this claim, which he accepts, is incompatible with his conceptualism, namely the thesis that the contents of perception are fully conceptual. If we want to give justice to the image of perception as openness to facts, we have to acknwoledge that perception relates us to a non-conceptual world.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Mind, body, and world: Todes and McDowell on bodies and language.Joseph Rouse - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):38-61.
Philosophy of perception as a guide to aesthetics.Bence Nanay - 2014 - In Greg Currie, Aaron Meskin, Matthew Kieran & Jon Robson (eds.), Aesthetics and the Sciences of the Mind.
Dreams, Perception, and Creative Realization.Katie Glaskin - 2015 - Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (4):664-676.
The primacy of fact perception.Aaron Allen Schiller - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593.
Epistemic openness and perceptual defeasibility. [REVIEW]Michael G. F. Martin - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):441-448.
Geist, Körper und Welt: Todes und McDowell über Körper und Sprache.Joseph Rouse - 2013 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (5-6):787-809.
Moral knowledge by perception.Sarah McGrath - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.
Preconceptual intelligibility in perception.Daniel Dwyer - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):533-553.
A limited defense of moral perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
Les trois modes perceptifs et le concept d’image chez Bergson.Ioulia Podoroga - 2009 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 1 (2):351-367.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
205 (#89,965)

6 months
2 (#670,035)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jérôme Dokic
Institut Jean Nicod

Citations of this work

Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.
McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Conscious experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.
Truth.J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson & D. R. Cousin - 1950 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 24 (1):111-172.
Does tense logic rest on a mistake?Gareth Evans - 1985 - In Collected papers. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 343-363.

View all 16 references / Add more references