Phenomenological approaches to non-conceptual content

HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 6 (1):58-78 (2017)
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Abstract

Over the past years McDowell’s conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl’s work, arguing that Husserl’s theory of fulfillment challenges conceptualism and that his notion of “real content” is non-conceptual. Still others, by contrast, hold that Husserl’s later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell’s theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that phenomenology does not have to choose between any of these positions. Central to the outline I offer is that there are multiple approaches to non-conceptual content in play today. By separating them we can begin to oversee the diversity of phenomenological contributions to the debate about non-conceptual content. I conclude that current literature presents us with at least three sound phenomenological accounts of non-conceptual content, but also that these are generally not incompatible with conceptualism.

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Corijn van Mazijk
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):333-351.
Gertrud Kuznitzky and Edith Stein on (non)conceptual experience.Daniel Neumann - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):607-621.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

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