Grain and content

Philosophical Issues 9:353-358 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

lt is widely held that entertaining a belief or forming a judgement involves the exercise of conceptual capacities; and to this extent the representational content of a belief or judgement is said to be "con— ceptual". According to Gareth Evans (1980), not all psychological states have conceptual content in this sense. In particular, perceptual states have non—conceptual content; it is not until one forms a judgement on the basis of a perceptual experience that one touches the realm of conceptual content.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,621

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Are there different kinds of content?Richard Heck - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 117-138.
How to Think About Nonconceptual Content.Walter Hopp - 2010 - The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
What makes perceptual content non-conceptual?Sean D. Kelly - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
Perceptual experience has conceptual content.Bill Brewer - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
Kantian non-conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
118 (#137,874)

6 months
2 (#646,201)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Neale
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references