Behavior and Philosophy 30:43 - 59 (2002)
Abstract |
If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possible causal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring to a situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) by referring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S. Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes a disposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositional explanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. The dispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - New York: The Free Press.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
View all 46 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Preferences: Neither Behavioural nor Mental.Francesco Guala - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401.
Explanatory Pluralism in the Medical Sciences: Theory and Practice.Leen De Vreese, Erik Weber & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (5):371-390.
Explaining Social Norm Compliance. A Plea for Neural Representations.Matteo Colombo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):217-238.
The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions.Erik Weber & Robrecht Vanderbeeken - 2005 - Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):1 - 16.
View all 8 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Dispositions, Explanation, and Behavior.Laird Addis - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):205 – 227.
Dispositions and Rational Explanation.Jason Bridges - 2011 - In Jason Bridges Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
Dispositions in Physics.Andreas Hüttemann - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. De Gruyter. pp. 221-237.
Causal Structuralism, Dispositional Actualism, and Counterfactual Conditionals.Antony Eagle - 2009 - In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press. pp. 65--99.
Non‐Committal Causal Explanations.David Pineda - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.
Forms of Causal Explanation.Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Robrecht Vanderbeeken - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):437-454.
Dispositional Essentialism and the Necessity of Laws.Robin Findlay Hendry & Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):668-677.
The Ontology of Pure Dispositions.William A. Bauer - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Structural Properties.Alexander Bird - 2003 - In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 155-68.
Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and Individualism in Psychology.Robert A. Wilson - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):55-75.
Self and Other in the Explanation of Behavior: 30 Years Later.Joshua Knobe & Bertram Malle - 2002 - Psychologica Belgica 42:113-130.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2011-05-29
Total views
31 ( #368,644 of 2,507,504 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,626 of 2,507,504 )
2011-05-29
Total views
31 ( #368,644 of 2,507,504 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,626 of 2,507,504 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads