Dispositional explanations in dualism

Filozofija I Društvo 24 (4):218-241 (2013)
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Abstract

In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes.

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Janko Nešić
University of Belgrade

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References found in this work

How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.

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