Abstract

This chapter explores the main argument for scientific realism, the No-Miracle Argument (NMA), and two antirealist arguments criticizing scientific realism, the Pessimistic Induction and the argument from Underdetermination. Scientific realists have articulated many different versions of their doctrine in response to the acknowledged shortcomings of the original NMA. While most rely on an inference to the best explanation, they propose stricter notions of novel predictive success, richer notion of success in general, and more discriminating ways of identifying the parts of a theory responsible for that success. When one looks at the history of science, especially the scientific revolutions in physics, astronomy, and chemistry chronicled in T. S. Kuhn, the realist seems to be in a bind. For Kuhn, and later Larry Laudan, gave many examples of theories that were successful in their day and recognize as based on radically false assumptions about the world.