For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the (...) sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism. (shrink)

This paper discusses main issues concerning Toulmin’s theory of evolutionary development of scientific knowledge. The reconstruction of Toulmin’s assumptions, which underlie the theory, and the presentation of the theory itself, is followed by the analysis of the difficulties of the conception in general. The author tries to show that these difficulties consist primarily in the discrepancy between what Toulmin aimed at and what he actually achieved. The problem is that although incorporating the means of Darwin’s theory may itself be — (...) in the context of describing the growth of scientifi c knowledge — justifi able, it is not consistent with Toulmin’s demand for the rationality of science. The purpose of creating the evolutionary theory was, as Toulmin claimed, to give an account of the development of scientific knowledge which would be non-relativistic and rationalistic. However, this purpose is, as the author argues, not achievable on the grounds of Toulmin’s accounts of rationality. Key words S. TOULMIN, SCIENCE, EVOLUTION. (shrink)

Arguments from authority and critical thinking. Side notes toLogic and Argumentation by Andrzej KisielewiczThe article focuses on the role of arguments from authority — or, more precisely, arguments from expert opinion – in rational argumentation and reasoning, in the contemporary context of specialisation of the sciences on the one hand, and the abundance of information on the other. The pretext for this is provided by Andrzej Kisielewicz’s new book: Logika i argumentacja. Praktyczny kurs krytycznego myślenia Logic and Argumentation. A Practical (...) Course In Critical Thinking. I point out that, although Kisielewicz’s book is a valuable contribution to the Polish market of textbooks on argumentation, practical logic and critical thinking, it understates the importance of teaching the ways of proper assessment of arguments from authority, credibility of experts and information sources. I argue that arguments from authority should not be by definition dismissed as fallacies; on the contrary, appealing to authority to expert opinion is an unavoidable element of rational argumentation – at least whenever the discussion requires one to refer to contemporary scientific knowledge. However, relying on experts’ opinions involves genuine risks to the rationality of the debate, many of them having to do with the abundance of pseudoexperts and irresponsibility on the side of some scientists an extensive example is provided by the presentation of statements on GMO’s made by a certain Polish body of scientists. Therefore, the ability to distinguish correct appeals to authority from faulty ones including the ability to tell actual experts from pseudoexperst and reliable sources of information from unreliable ones should be considered a crucial competence which critical thinking courses should teach. (shrink)