The Defense of Scientific Realism —From “No-Miracle Argument”

Abstract

The No-Miracle Argument (NMA) is one of the main argumentation frameworks of scientific realism. Many rebuttals have been offered by antirealists around NMA, the important of which are the Pessimistic Meta-induction (PMI), the Circular Argument, and the Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence. This essay attempts to defend NMA and scientific realism by refuting these three major refutations.

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Huitong Zhou
University of Bristol

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