Abstract

One of the most puzzling aspects of the concept of a work of art is that if an object is really a work of art, then it merits a person's attention or consideration, regardless of that person's specific tastes or interests. The question "What is the nature of art?" is, therefore, a matter of what a work of art is such that the fact that something is a work of art could make a difference in this way. I argue that the phrase 'work of art,' when it has the consequences that interest us, does not to mark out any set of descriptions as true of all and only works of art. ;I begin with a careful examination of what it is to say what a sort of thing necessarily or essentially is. To this end, I discuss the standard philosophical model of real definition, as well as the sorts of account we can give of such ordinary concepts as that of a chair and a novel. In contrast to these sorts of concepts, no set of descriptions stands in the right relation to the concept of a work of art. I then consider whether it would be possible to build an account of a work of art out of the notion of goodness. I argue that we cannot take seriously the behavior of 'good' and 'bad' in inferences and maintain that goodness supplies a set of descriptions to which all and only works of art answer. ;Ultimately, I propose that the concept of a work of art is the concept of that which is better than it has to be. I argue that this formula does justice to the necessary connection between works of art and goodness, and that it furnishes a justification for the idea that only works of art surpass differences of taste and interest