Abstract

The dissertation is an analysis of one definition of art, an examination of two case studies of artistic change, and a suggestion of some parallels between how aesthetics views art as an institution and how feminists criticize pornography as a social institution of sex discrimination. I begin with an overview of the current state of feminist theory and argue that Catharine MacKinnon's work has been misread. ;I then analyze Marcia Eaton's definition of the term 'work of art' and criticize her account of how works of art are evaluated, especially her account of what she calls "bad works of art." I then distinguish between evolutionary and confrontational change in artistic traditions and claim Eaton's theory inadequately accommodates the fact that there is more than one artistic tradition, or artworld; nor does she address how the dominant artworld makes works of art in its terms of artifacts that are works of art in other artistic traditions. ;The case studies concern one set of artifacts which have become works of art , and another set which have ceased being works of art . Both were taken up or put out by the dominant artworld. The purpose of the studies is to test Eaton's definition against examples of artistic change and to give evidence for the discussion of two corollaries of MacKinnon's analysis of pornography: feminist pornography and/or erotica will not fundamentally alter the sexual situation of women; the way the anti-pornography ordinance will work to change how pornography is used in the subordination of women is by changing the way it is treated, used, and conceptualized. ;Finally, I compare the structure of Eaton's definition with the structure of the MacKinnon definition of pornography; the structure is the source of their mutual usefulness and power as definitions of complex social institutions. Finally, I draw some tentative conclusions about how a feminist critique of art might begin