Gerhard Thonhauser
Freie Universität Berlin
The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based accounts, and phenomenological fusion accounts. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and summarizing the elements that a multifaceted theory of shared emotions requires, I turn to the work of the early phenomenologist Edith Stein to further advance an approach to shared emotions that combines the main strengths of Helm and Salmela’s concern-based accounts and Schmid’s phenomenological fusion account. According to this proposal, the sharedness of a shared emotion cannot be located in one element, but rather consists in a complex of interrelated features.
Keywords Shared emotions  Collective emotions  Affective intentionality  Communal experience  Edith Stein
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1007/s11097-018-9561-3
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The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.

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Emotional Sharing in Football Audiences.Gerhard Thonhauser & Michael Wetzels - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (2):224-243.

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