Evaluative vs. Deontic Concepts

In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley. pp. 1791-99 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ethical thought is articulated around normative concepts. Standard examples of normative concepts are good, reason, right, ought, and obligatory. Theorists often treat the normative as an undifferentiated domain. Even so, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of normative concepts: evaluative or axiological concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. This encyclopedia entry discusses the many differences between the two kinds of concepts.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

The Normativity of Evaluative Concepts.Christine Tappolet - 2014 - In Anne Reboul (ed.), Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, Volume 2. pp. 39-54.
Thick Concepts and Underdetermination.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-160.
How Are Thick Terms Evaluative?Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-20.
What are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.
Shapelessness and the thick.Debbie Roberts - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):489-520.
Thinning the Thicket.Kenneth Shockley - 2012 - Environmental Ethics 34 (3):227-246.
Objectionable thick concepts in denials.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.
Thick Concepts and Variability.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-17.
Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology.Guy Axtell & J. Adam Carter - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):413-434.
‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model.Olga Ramírez - 2012 - Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.
Moral Emotions and Thick Ethical Concepts.Sunny Yang - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:469-479.
From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans.Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 515-535.
The Sense and Reference of Evaluative Terms.Christine Tappolet - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference one Hundred Years later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 113--127.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-04-18

Downloads
107 (#163,669)

6 months
1 (#1,461,875)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal

Citations of this work

Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.
Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):290-319.
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references