Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):45-51 (2012)

In the discussion about Yablo’s Paradox, a debated topic is the status of infinitary proofs. It is usually considered that, although a realist could (with some effort) accept them, an anti-realist could not do it at all. In this paper I will argue that there are plausible reasons for an anti-realist to accept infinitary proofs and rules of inference. En la discusión sobre la Paradoja de Yablo, un tópico debatido es el estatus de las pruebas infinitarias. Se suele considerar que, aunque un realista podría (con cierto esfuerzo) aceptarlas, un anti-realista no podría hacerlo en absoluto. En este artículo, argumento que hay razones plausibles para que un anti-realista acepte pruebas y reglas de inferencia infinitarias
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References found in this work BETA

Wang's Paradox.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.
On the Concept of Following Logically.Alfred Tarski - 2002 - History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):155-196.
Strict Finitism.Crispin Wright - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):203 - 282.
Is Yablo’s Paradox Non-Circular?J. C. Beall - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):176–87.

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