The paper deals with the enactivist approach to the problem of consciousness. The problem of consciousness is the problem of naturalistic explanation of phenomenal aspects of our experience. According to classical cognitive science, we can explain all mental states as functional, representational states. Many philosophers disagree with this view. They demonstrate that phenomenal qualities of conscious states cannot be understood in terms of mental representations. Contemporary debates about the nature of phenomenal qualities are the debates between representationalists and anti-representationalists. The (...) arguments proposed by anti-representationalists demonstrate the insufficiency of classical representational approach. But it doesn't mean that we should accept the existence of qualia - special nonrepresentational phenomenal properties. It is possible to defend representationalism by reconsidering the nature of mental representations. This article examines the transformation of the concept of mental representation in cognitive science over the last few decades. It demonstrates that the notion of representation in action discussed in enactivist theories can help us to provide the foundation for naturalistic understanding of conscious experience. (shrink)

The paper deals with the analysis of Block's notion of two kinds of consciousness: phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Following Block, it is argued that insufficient attention has been paid to phenomenal aspects of our mental life in contemporary philosophy of mind. And it is exactly due to these aspects the task of explanation of consciousness turns out to be the hard problem. But Block's approach to phenomenal consciousness has a number of disadvantages. First of all it allows epiphenomenalism. To (...) avoid negative consequences of epiphenomenalism Dennett's suggestion to consider the problem of phenomenal consciousness as the matter of "richness of content" and "degree of influence" is adopted in the paper. In accordance with his ideas it is proposed to consider phenomenal consciousness as informational processes that achieve certain level of complexity and integrity. (shrink)

This article analyzes the extended mind hypothesis that has been discussed during the past two decades following the article “The Extended Mind” by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. It examines the position of active externalism and notes the shortcomings of the arguments supporting this position as proposed by Clark and Chalmers. It is demonstrated that the cultural-historical psychology developed by Vygotsky represents an alternative means of substantiating the extended mind hypothesis. Interpreting Vygotsky’s position as “active social externalism,” the author contrasts (...) Vygotsky’s theory with the active externalism of Clark and Chalmers, as well as with the classical externalism advocated by Putnam and Burge, showing the advantage of Vygotsky’s approach. This advantage has been seen in the ability of Vygotsky’s active social externalism to avoid the problems faced by other externalist approaches to explaining the mind. (shrink)

To explain evaluation we need to take into account the perspective of an evaluator, we need to turn to phenomenological approach in moral theory. This is the approach proposed by John McDowell. According to him, we need to approach to the question ‘How to live right?’ via the concept of a virtuous person. To lendsupport to his views McDowell employs Wittgensteinean philosophy that could be a good basis for establishing moral phenomenology as a metaethical approach to moral phenomena. First of (...) all, introducing the notion of language-game we can provide a metaethical explanation of moral terms referring to roles they play in certain language-games. From this point of view there is no difference between moral terms and other terms. But understanding a language-game not just as a model of a certain kind of behavior formed by external observer, but as a form of life we can capture moral phenomena form within. The language-game considered as the form of life allows us to discern certain phenomena as moral ones. That is why trying to answer the question about right livingfrom the virtuous person perspective we should be involved in a language game that carves moral phenomena from the brute stuff of the world and forms a certain kind of sensitivity in us to these properties. Wittgensteinean philosophy also allows us to answer the question: how can mere knowledge of situation make us behave? Following Wittgensteinean ideas, we can present moral knowledge as something uncodifiable, which is exhibited in our everyday life, in our way of living and ‘going on doing the same thing’. It is impossible to understand this knowledge from the external point of view. To see how this knowledge can motivate someone, we need to capture the way the person appreciates a particular situation. (shrink)

The article comprises three parts. Part I contains an overview of the areas in the analysis of modern French philosophy that have been of the greatest relevance to Russian researchers over the last years. We conclude that numerous aspects of the French philosophical thought of the twentieth century are well represented in the research of Russian authors, who also point out the emerging trends in its development. Part II deals with the development of analytic philosophy in Russia within the framework (...) of such areas as “critique of bourgeois philosophy”, a purely ideological stand only nominally related to philosophy, logic, and the history of philosophy and theoretical research. Part III contains a periodization of the history of phenomenology in Russia, pointing out the most important achievements of the contemporary Russian scholars of phenomenology as well as their understanding of the essence, the problems, and the aims of phenomenological philosophy. We also indicate the tendencies within the development of the discipline in the Russian Federation. (shrink)