Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):644-650 (2012)

Authors
Brian Talbot
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
Recently, a number of philosophers have turned to folk intuitions about mental states for data about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I argue that current research along these lines does not tell us about these subjects. I focus on a series of studies, performed by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery, to make my argument. Folk judgments studied by these researchers are mostly likely generated by a certain cognitive system – System One – that will generate the same data whether or not we experience phenomenal consciousness. This is a problem for a range of current experimental philosophy research into consciousness or our concept of it. If experimental philosophy is to shed light into phenomenal consciousness, it needs to be better founded in an understanding of how we make judgments.
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.005
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References found in this work BETA

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.
Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies.Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Curious Case of the Decapitated Frog: On Experiment and Philosophy.Alexander Klein - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):890-917.
Revisiting the Valence Account.Justin Sytsma - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):179-198.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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