Abstract

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the moral and political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. One of the central concerns in the moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is the attempt to provide an account of his theory of obligation which is consistent with his psychology. If Hobbes maintains that self-interest is the only motivation for voluntary action and he accepts some version of 'ought implies can', how can we understand his insistence that persons have moral obligations? Attempts to resolve this question have traditionally taken two forms. The first approach is within a framework of acknowledging Hobbes's psychological egoism. A. E. Taylor, Howard Warrender, and David Gauthier are all examples of this approach. Taylor and Warrender argue that Hobbes's theory of moral obligation must be understood independently of his psychology. Gauthier argues that Hobbes's psychology implies there is only a minimal theory of moral obligation to be found in Hobbes. The second approach denies that Hobbes is a psychological egoist. F. S. McNeilly, Jean Hampton, and Gregory Kavka are all examples of this approach. ;In my dissertation, I argue that both approaches are mistaken. I first establish that Hobbes is a psychological egoist and I then propose an account of his theory of obligation that is compatible with psychological assumptions. I begin by showing that the attempts to deny Hobbes's psychological egoism are mistaken. Having established that Hobbes is a psychological egoist, I then propose that Hobbes holds a unique, nontraditional form of ethical egoism that I call 'Secular Command Theory'. It is nontraditional because Hobbes does not claim that persons have an obligation to perform any action that is believed or is likely to maximize their best interests. On my account, persons have an obligation to obey the commands of the sovereign because it really is in their best interests. This obligation rests on Hobbes's insistence that, given epistemic limitations, it's really in a person's best interest to obey the sovereign. It is thus a form of indirect rule ethical egoism.