Hobbes's Deontological Science of Morals

Dissertation, City University of New York (1998)
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Abstract

It goes beyond saying that Hobbes is almost universally considered to be an uncompromising egoist. Needless to say, I reject this interpretation of Hobbes's ethical theory. I base my account on Hobbes's theory of obligation, his use of the Negative Golden Rule to justify the Laws of Nature and his non-consequentialist theory of moral worth. Standard interpreters, I argue, too often conflate self-interest with self-preservation when discussing Hobbes's theory of obligation. As such, self-preservation acts as a limiting condition on our obligations rather than the ground thereof. Covenants, Hobbes writes, "oblige of themselves". Furthermore, I contend that the Laws of Nature are not mere rules of prudence but are instead justified through the NGR, "A Rule by which these Laws may be easily examined". The NGR is a meta-rule, a rule for the evaluation of rules, available to even those of the "meanest capacity". It is a basic principle of natural equity, not a rule for the maximization of self-interest. Also, Hobbes explicitly recognizes that to be morally praiseworthy an agent must act for the right reason. Succinctly, to determine the moral worth of an action we look not to the act itself but to "the fountain from which it springs", i.e., its motive. For Hobbes, and not unlike Kant, an act only has moral worth if it is done for the "law's sake" and not out of "vain glory" or the "avoidance of punishment". Given this and a great deal of other textual support, I develop a sustained argument to show that Hobbes does not subscribe to any sort of moral consequentialism but is best characterized as a deontologist. This is not to say that Hobbes never appeals to self-interest, whether the "desire for commodious living" or the "feare of violent death" to induce individuals to keep their word, for such appeals provide a valuable tool in garnering political obedience. Nevertheless, I claim that these inducements, whether by carrot or stick, can never, for Hobbes, count as moral reasons thereunto. I then conclude by relying upon my understanding of Hobbes's moral theory to show that he is best interpreted as a natural law theorist as opposed to a legal positivist

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