Abstract

To be said to possess agency, an individual or entity must act with intent. What constitutes an intentional action is, roughly, that the action is something an agent wishes or desires to do. In order to perform intentional actions however, there seems to be much that must underpin this process. For example, having a complex range of desires, beliefs, and deliberations which are involved in bringing those intentional actions about. A satisfactory account of agency should be able to explain how these complex range of desires, beliefs and deliberations occur to bring about intentional actions. The aim of this paper is to answer whether Artificial Intelligence has what it takes to be considered agents. At first glance, it appears that AI can calculate, weigh up different options, choose the best one which will ensure the best possible outcome, right a wrong, troubleshoot, solve a problem etc. And, we might further be moved to say that these machines perform actions, perhaps we could go so far as to say that they seemingly perform intentional actions. But are they agents? As things stand, according to the features of common-ground agency, AI in its more traditional rules-and-representations version, and possibly, AI in its more dynamic version, fail to exhibit the features of common-ground agency and therefore fail at the game of agency.