There seems to me to be a problem with the interpretation of Jean-Paul Sartre’s use of the words “being” and “nothingness” in his philosophy. Is his idea of being the same as that of Heidegger? While I’m quite sure of the metaphysical aspects of the argument, I’m not sure whether within those aspects Sartre equates nothingness with freedom, or whether the freedom (of action) arises from the nothingness. This short essay attempts to find a solution to the problem.
Keywords Sartre  Being  Nothingness
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