Abstract

The aim of the present work is twofold: to present and clarify Sartre's ontology as presented within Being and Nothingness$\sp1$ and to investigate the question whether or not an ethics, compatible with Sartre's own ethical ideal, is possible within the context of that ontology. ;Although Sartre never fully develops the ethical implications of his thought, there is evidence in his writings as well as in his constant efforts to support the freedom of all people against tyranny and oppression that suggests the type of ethical position Sartre would commit himself to. This would be an ethics wherein one is obligated to will one's own freedom and the freedom of all people as the primary value in life. Indeed, Sartre's ideal ethical society is one wherein everyone takes each other's freedom as an end-in-itself. ;Critics of Sartre claim that his ontology conflicts with such an ethics. Human reality seems to be reduced to a "useless passion," while human relations seem to lead to an inevitable conflict from which there is no exit. Sartre also rejects objective values, making values relative to the free choice of the individual. This seems to negate the possibility of moral obligation. Defenders of Sartre claim otherwise and attempt to derive the moral obligation to will the freedom of others as a value from the ontology. I intend to show that there are problems with this attempt. What both critics and defenders of Sartre share is the assumption that ethical relativism is not a viable option. I will argue that this contention is unfounded and that it is precisely upon a relativistic ethics that Sartre's ideal ethical society is to be based. ftn$\sp1$Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes