Abstract

In this work I argue against commentators who claim that the theory of freedom which Sartre presents in Being and Nothingness, as well as his views about the conflict that underlies all human relationships, prevents Sartre from developing a viable ethics. I argue that the ethics Sartre develops in his Notebooks for an Ethics is consistent with the theory of freedom advanced in Being and Nothingness, and that it presents a model for escaping the hostility between individuals described in the earlier work. I further argue that Sartre develops his ethics as an alternative to the duty-based systems that currently dominate moral philosophy. Primarily, he believed that these other systems did not concern themselves with improving the quality of interpersonal relationships; this concern, which I argue is central to his ethics, distinguishes Sartre from most other systems. Finally, I demonstrate that Sartre's insights into the manner in which individuals affect one another's freedom can make a contribution towards debates within contemporary political philosophy