Truth, Truths, and Pluralism

Journal of Speculative Philosophy 34 (4):526-544 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACT I document the contemporary war on truth by authoritarian leaders and regimes, focusing on its distinctive sites, scope, and tactics. In this context, I explain both the pressing need to defend pluralism and the ways pluralism has been co-opted for antidemocratic goals. This defense of pluralism includes an epistemic creed and, flowing from this creed, four strategies for action to counter the war on truth: change of government leadership through the electoral process ; countertactics to the new authoritarian communication techniques ; creation of individual habits enabled by the skills of effective inquiry, communication, and imagination ; and, adequate resources, freedom, and public commitment to institutions that produce truth and accept different truths—research and education, the press and media, and the courts and judicial system. I claim that collectively these four responses are the only possibly effective ones—and thus that they all are necessary. Whether or not they are sufficient is an issue that rests with melioristic action and, thus, can be judged only after and by the consequences of that action.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Simplifying alethic pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
Forms of correspondence: the intricate route from thought to reality.Gila Sher - 2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 157--179.
Pluralisms in Truth and Logic.Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Causal grounds for negative truths.Robin Stenwall - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):2973-2989.
Reply to Stephen Angle.Macbeth Danielle - 2017 - Philosophy East and West 67 (4):989-990.
Sellars, Truth Pluralism, and Truth Relativism.Lionel Shapiro - 2020 - In Stefan Brandt & Anke Breunig (eds.), Wilfrid Sellars and Twentieth-Century Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 174–206.
Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Reply to Andrew Brenner.Kris McDaniel - 2020 - Philosophy East and West 70 (2):557-565.
Trivial Truths and the Aim of Inquiry.NicK Treanor - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):552-559.
Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.
The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-11-13

Downloads
11 (#1,132,055)

6 months
1 (#1,461,875)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John J. Stuhr
Emory University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references