- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Trivial Truths and the Aim of Inquiry
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):552-559 (2012)
Abstract
A pervasive and influential argument appeals to trivial truths to demonstrate that the aim of inquiry is not the acquisition of truth. But the argument fails, for it neglects to distinguish between the complexity of the sentence used to express a truth and the complexity of the truth expressed by a sentence.Author's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
How trivial is the “trivial neuron doctrine”?Steven G. Daniel - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):834-835.
Reducts of Stable, CM-Trivial Theories.Herwig Nübling - 2005 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 (4):1025 - 1036.
The “trivial neuron doctrine” is not trivial.Dale Jamieson - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):841-842.
From Knowledge to Wisdom: The Need for an Academic Revolution.Nicholas Maxwell - 2007 - London Review of Education 5:97-115.
What’s Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?Nicholas Maxwell - 2015 - Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 3 (2):5-31.
Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
Messianic vs Myopic Realism.Isaac Levi - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:617-636.
Theorizing justification.Peter J. Graham - 2010 - In Joseph Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harvey Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 45-72.
The Relation Between General and Particular: Entailment vs. Supervenience.Phillip Bricker - 2006 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 251-287.
Analytics
Added to PP
2012-07-26
Downloads
1,272 (#8,750)
6 months
176 (#14,951)
2012-07-26
Downloads
1,272 (#8,750)
6 months
176 (#14,951)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.
The value of knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
References found in this work
Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Notebooks, 1914-1916.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1961 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by G. H. von Wright & G. E. M. Anscombe.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6d9b7f7c4c-sqt28 uwo