Abstract

This dissertation proposes and defends a new conception of ideology. My focus is the sense the term "ideology" takes on in political theory , according to which ideology is, at a minimum, discourse which bears some covert connection with political norms or interests. I argue that ideology should be understood as a matter of the political character of discursive content, i.e. of linguistic meaning or conceptual content. ;The predominant conception of ideology--the "functional false consciousness" conception--assumes that ideology critique is always functional critique , and, simultaneously, epistemic critique . This conception of ideology has come under attack from several quarters. According to the alternative conception I develop, ideology is discourse which is "implicitly" political; ideology critique reveals the ways in which political interests and norms shape the very meaning or content of discourse. This conception captures the core of the way the term "ideology" is used in critical social theory but avoids the problems associated with the traditional conception. ;The conception of ideology I have developed depends on an assumption about discursive content: that it can be political, regardless of whether it refers to political phenomena. I argue that recent views of conceptual content and linguistic meaning--according to which these are social and normative--open up this very possibility. The social norms which characterize discursive content must be understood as more than "purely linguistic", and cannot be reduced to minimal constraints of rationality. But by the same token, ideology critique does not necessarily impugn the rationality of the discourse it critiques. ;The central assumption about ideology critique I am rejecting--that it is a kind of epistemic critique--makes it especially difficult to understand critiques of epistemic norms themselves. For example, the traditional conception of ideology as false consciousness makes it difficult to understand feminist critiques of reason and rationality. In contrast, the conception of ideology I have developed makes better sense of feminist critiques of epistemic norms, and allows for a better appreciation of the philosophical significance of those critiques